Release authentication status
Summary
Section titled “Summary”This page summarizes what MoreBC2 currently knows about BitcoinII Core release authentication.
The current release baseline is v31.1.0. The current GitHub release contains six uploaded binary archives. GitHub reports a SHA-256 digest for each one, and MoreBC2 independently hashed the Windows Qt archive used in the September 11 Windows runtime test and obtained the same SHA-256 value.
That one local hash match is useful repeat-byte integrity evidence. It does not establish publisher authentication of the release.
The deeper v29.1.0 artifact audit remains preserved as historical evidence for that release only.
Current v31.1.0 status
Section titled “Current v31.1.0 status”| Item | Status | Evidence / limit |
|---|---|---|
| Current release identity | Observed | v31.1.0, published 2026-08-29 on the canonical GitHub release path. |
| Release inventory freshness | Time-scoped | Release updated 2026-09-06; GitHub currently reports immutable: false. |
| Uploaded release asset inventory | Observed | Six uploaded binary archives currently recorded. |
| GitHub-reported SHA-256 digests | Observed hosting metadata | GitHub exposes SHA-256 digest metadata for all six uploaded assets. This is not a maintainer-signed checksum manifest. |
| Independent local artifact hashes | Partial | The Windows Qt archive was independently hashed on 2026-09-11 and matched GitHub’s reported digest. The other five current assets have no independent MoreBC2 hash record yet. |
| Windows Qt executable fingerprint | Locally recorded | Extracted executable SHA-256 8b918df903377565a9d7fa59d2d2dc087ed77155c858b2a0abcdee03f0423db5; Authenticode NotSigned. |
| Tag type | Observed | refs/tags/v31.1.0 currently points directly to commit 8daaf7b12e71d3646eed787f040bf2899a69dc1c, so the tag is lightweight. |
| Target commit signature state | Observed | GitHub reports verified: true, reason: valid, with a signature present in the commit-verification payload. |
| Publisher checksum manifest | Not established | No current release attachment such as SHA256SUMS or equivalent is present. |
| Detached release/asset signature | Not established | No current detached signature attachment has been established. |
| Published trusted BitcoinII release key | Not established | GitHub commit verification is not equivalent to a documented BitcoinII release-signing-key trust path. |
| Binary-to-source binding | Not established | No current uploaded binary has been proven to be a reproducible build of the tagged source. |
| Reproducible-build proof | Not established | No release-specific public reproducibility evidence has been established by MoreBC2. |
See v31.1.0 release assets and Windows v31.1.0 node and RPC validation — 2026-09-11.
What the Windows Qt hash match means
Section titled “What the Windows Qt hash match means”The September 11 runtime test independently calculated:
f7b1d16423859bd2392b1bd4f62c16ba855a034c6ffb6693af667f2ec97b375dfor BitcoinII-v31.1-Win64-Qt.zip, exactly matching GitHub’s release-asset digest.
That supports saying the locally tested archive bytes matched the bytes represented by GitHub’s current digest metadata for that asset.
It does not answer who should be trusted to define the expected hash, whether the archive was built from the tagged source, or whether a BitcoinII maintainer signed the archive or its checksum.
Tag/commit authentication boundary
Section titled “Tag/commit authentication boundary”The v31.1.0 tag currently resolves directly to a commit rather than to a separately signed annotated-tag object.
The target commit is reported by GitHub as cryptographically verified. This strengthens provenance for the commit object itself, but it does not create a cryptographic chain from that commit to the six uploaded binary archives.
For release authentication, keep these separate:
tag target / source commit provenance !=release-asset integrity !=publisher-authenticated expected hashes !=binary-to-source reproducibilityInherited signing tooling is not current release proof
Section titled “Inherited signing tooling is not current release proof”The BitcoinII Core source tree contains Bitcoin Core-derived Guix and release-process material that references SHA256SUMS, SHA256SUMS.asc, signature gathering, and binary verification.
Those inherited files show that the repository contains release-verification tooling and documentation. They do not establish that the BitcoinII v31.1.0 release used that process, published matching attestations, or adopted Bitcoin Core’s signing trust model.
A current repository search for v31.1.0 SHA256SUMS returned no release-specific result.
Historical v29.1.0 authentication record
Section titled “Historical v29.1.0 authentication record”On 2026-08-27 MoreBC2 performed a deeper bounded integrity/authentication review of v29.1.0.
That record includes:
- 10 uploaded assets captured from GitHub API metadata;
- two GitHub-generated source archives recorded separately;
- independent local hashes for all 12 downloads;
- uploaded-asset size/hash comparison with GitHub metadata;
- bounded tag/commit signature review;
- searches for checksum manifests, detached signatures, and trusted BitcoinII release-key material.
The conclusion for that historical release remained that integrity fingerprints were recorded but publisher-authenticated binary provenance was not established.
See Release-artifact authentication record — 2026-08-27.
Evidence boundary
Section titled “Evidence boundary”Do not treat any of the following as equivalent to publisher-authenticated release binaries:
- a GitHub release page existing;
- GitHub-reported digest metadata;
- one or more local hash matches without an independently trusted expected value;
- a GitHub verified commit marker;
- a lightweight release tag;
- inherited release-verification tooling in the source tree;
- source comparison alone;
- historical hashes from another BitcoinII release.
A stronger release-verification path normally requires an independently trusted expected value or provenance path, such as a publisher-signed checksum manifest, trusted release key, reproducible-build attestation, or another maintainer-approved authentication process.
Current next steps
Section titled “Current next steps”- Independently download and hash the other five
v31.1.0assets. - Fingerprint the current GitHub-generated v31 source archives if they are used in verification.
- Check project-controlled locations for current BitcoinII-specific checksum/signature/key material.
- Document any maintainer-approved release trust path if one is published.
- Keep commit authentication, archive integrity, platform code signing, and binary reproducibility as separate evidence classes.
Related pages
Section titled “Related pages”- Current v31.1.0 asset record
- Release verification guide
- Signing and checksum roadmap
- BitcoinII releases
- Historical v29.1.0 authentication record
Verification
Section titled “Verification”Status: Reviewed / Clearly bounded partial
Primary sources checked: Current v31.1.0 release/tag/commit metadata, repository search, and dated MoreBC2 release/runtime records
Notes: Six current assets are observed; one current archive has an independent MoreBC2 hash match. Publisher-authenticated checksum/signature infrastructure and reproducible-build provenance remain unestablished.